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BOOKS
BOOK REVIEWS
THE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUBJECTIVE FACTORS IN LAW, BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH GERMAN
LAWYERS. By Walter 0. Weyrauch.1 New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 316. $7.50.
The practice of law, like that of medicine, ministry or pedagogy, is
in the care of skilled specialists who, because of prolonged training,
continued commitment to expertise and social responsibility, are called
"professionals." This characterization does not exhaust the catalogue
of criteria that distinguish a professional from members of other occupations, but it is sufficient to pinpoint a central problem of professional
life. The problem is essentially this: precisely because he has had the
advantage of specialized training and experience, the doctor, the pastor,
the teacher or the lawyer is the stronger partner in the relationship with
patient, communicant, student or client. He controls the interpersonal
situation with regard to the person who comes to him for help. Our
conventional use of the word "help" seems to confirm the asymmetrical
nature of the relationship, and out of recognition of this asymmetry
arises the particular obligation of the professional not to exploit the
relationship for his own purposes. To harness the problem, the professions have developed codes of ethics which define, among other
things, what is to be considered proper conduct in the practitioner's
relationship with his clientele.
But are the social restraints imposed on the professional sufficient to
offset the power imbalance in the relationship between himself and his
client? A great deal of the variance in professional conduct can be
explained on the level of social analysis, that is, in terms of professional
roles and rules. But there remains an area of conduct which cannot be
explained in terms of social roles alone, and where analysis on the
deeper level of personality is in order. If the professional's relationship
with his client is to be successful-successful in the sense that the
client derives from the contact those satisfactions which it is reasonable
for him to expect-it is also likely to depend on the degree of self1 Professor of Law, University of Florida.
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awareness and self-knowledge which the practitioner brings into the
situation. Such self-awareness and self-knowledge, in turn, are likely
to be functions of what is loosely called a man's personality.
While some practitioners in any profession seem to have a personality
especially suited to the performance of professional tasks, others may
only approximate desirable personality characteristics, and still others
may be altogether devoid of them. Of course, if every member of a
profession had just the right personality, there would be little reason
for concern and even less incentive for personality study. But as many
practitioners may not have and probably do not have suitable personality traits, the study of the personalities of professionals should be
high on the agenda of a profession's self-scrutiny. Admittedly, there
are persons with personality characteristics that make them palpably
unfit for a given type of professional work, but these people arehopefully-eliminated early in the course of their educational preparation. In any case, there undoubtedly remain enough practitioners
whose effectiveness could be greatly improved by self-conscious insight
into and control over personality characteristics which interfere with
professional functions.
If I understand the intent of Professor Weyrauch's study of the
personalities of (German) lawyers correctly, it has two major objectives: first, to discover just what the personalities of his subjects area diagnostic objective; and second, to formulate desirable traits which,
if internalized, would contribute to shaping the lawyer's personality in
support of a "wide distribution of democratic values among all persons"
(p. 279)-a prescriptive objective.
In some respects, these two objectives are interdependent. For the
evaluation of given personality characteristics is predicated on a standard which would define desirable characteristics. If such a standard
were agreed upon, the task of diagnosis would be greatly facilitated.
But it is not. In particular, there seem to be two viewpoints that are
diametrically opposed. On the one hand, there are those-I would
think they are the vast majority of practicing psychiatrists or psychoanalysts-whose standard of the normal personality is defined for them
by the culture in which they live, or, more correctly, by the culture as
they perceive and interpret it. On the other hand, there are those who
take the view that the culture itself may be or is sick, and that it cannot
provide, therefore, a desirable standard for assessing personality traits.
The task of this second group, then, is twofold: first, to postulate a set
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of desirable cultural values, and second, to construct an image of the
healthy personality, that is, the kind of personality conducive to the
creation and maintenance of the preferred cultural value system.
The main difficulty with the first viewpoint is that it is largely
tautological. The construct of an ongoing culture, whatever it is
(authoritarian, democratic, anomic, anal, etc.), is derived from some
distribution (mean, median, mode) of the personalties found in the
culture and becomes an empirical type. The normal personality is the
personality that comes closest to the culture construct. Pathology is
defined as deviation from the construct. But as the culture construct
is itself a distributive or exaggerated model, it is self-fulfilling. Normal
persons are those whom the culture defines as normal.
The difficulty with the second viewpoint-and Professor Weyrauch's
study falls into this category-is that in postulating a desirable set of
values to be internalized before a personality can be described as
healthy, an almost unbridgeable gap occurs between what is real and
what is preferred in personality. If one inspects-from the perspective
of what a healthy person should be-what one finds in reality, the resultant picture looks grim indeed, and if the picture is drawn as a collective profile by methods which tend to select and exaggerate particular traits, the picture looks not just grim but dismal.
Now, the negative picture itself, as it emerges from Professor
Weyrauch's study, for instance, does not bother me as such and as
much as it may be bothering others, especially members of the legal
fraternity. What bothers me is the implicit process of infinite regression to which any criticism of the profile must necessarily lead. If the
criticism comes from the legal profession, it must be interpreted as
some sort of irrational defense mechanism-lawyers are not willing
(or able?) to see the culture for what it is; they are not willing (or
able?) to see themselves for what they really are; or they distort
(unconsciously?) their self-images to make themselves comfortable
in what is really a detestable cultural environment.
This is not to say that I reject the notion, quite well articulated by
Professor Weyrauch, that professionals seem particularly resistant to
analysis of the relationship between their institutional roles and their
personalities. But it cannot be simply ascribed to psychological defensiveness. Rather, it is probably due in large part to the institutional
role requirement that the professional, in his interpersonal relations,
maintain sufficient social distance from the client, lest his objectivity
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be impaired and his impartiality in dealing with clients be jeopardized.
Why, indeed, should personality have anything to do with the doctor's
technical skills, the minister's oratorical clarity, or the lawyer's knowledge of the law and court procedure? I am not defending these
questions (for they are ill-conceived, though often asked). I merely
want to suggest that while much human behavior is personality-related
and should certainly be studied from the perspective of personality, a
much greater variance in behavior can be explained (and more economically) by reference to institutionally-prescribed roles and rules
which are followed quite irrespective of particular personality dynamics.
It is necessary, at this point, to say something more than the problem
perhaps warrants about Professor Weyrauch's methods of inquiry and
interpretation, largely because he himself devotes 63 out of 282 pages
to methodology. And I shall not touch on methodological matters that
are not immediately germane. Professor Weyrauch went to Germany
and talked with some 130 persons, including 34 attorneys, 32 judges,
19 law professors, 18 government lawyers and state attorneys, 6
house counsels or business lawyers, 4 law students, and 17 laymen.
The latter included two legislators and four housewives married to
lawyers. The rest of the laymen are not clearly identified. In choosing
the sample, Professor Weyrauch sought to avoid the "common danger
of distortion resulting from a one-sided selection of an elite sample" as
well as the danger of selecting "eccentric lawyers and cranks" which
might "facilitate a manufactured conclusion of the emotional instability
of lawyers" (p. 35). He continues: "To counteract these dangers lawyers were frequently chosen by chance. The interviewer accidentally
met an acquaintance on the streets or at some social occasion and
engaged him in a conversation that eventually led to the interview. In
other instances, mere chance led to a spontaneous interview with a
stranger" (p. 35).
Of the total sample, 63 were subjected to longer interviews than the
rest. As to the length of the interviews, we learn that "intensity and
content of the interviews varied from case to case. Some subjects were
interviewed for hours, in a few instances for days, others for shorter
periods. Sometimes a casual conversation of a few minutes was incorporated in the research because it was pertinent" (p. 35). The interviews are said to have been conducted by the method of free association: "The line of associations was left to the subjects, the interviewer
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merely encouraging their flow of thoughts. This process proved capable
of yielding data of surprising content and depth. Indeed, the method
of stimulating free association was later adopted as the main strategy
of interviewing" (p. 41).
This must suffice as a summary of the author's methods, though he
makes a great many other observations. Now, the issue I want to
discuss is whether, given the goal of constructing a collective profile of
the legal profession, these methods are adequate and appropriate.
First, the sample. As quantitative evaluation was not the object of the
research, the smallness of the sample is not objectionable as such.
What is objectionable, however, is the way in which respondents and
informants were chosen (and, moreover, it is never clear just who is
quoted, and whether the quotations come from a conversation of a
"few minutes" or from interviews carried on "for days"). We are told
they were selected "by chance" or "accidentally." But, in fact, the
sample was anything but random. Evidently anticipating this criticism,
Professor Weyrauch writes:
Of course this method does not preclude distortion by the unconscious
preferences of the author, for instance, because of his choices of contacts
and the type of his past law practice. However, the numerous professional
contacts of the author while practicing law in Germany did not always
depend on his volition. They were frequently initiated in the compulsory
context of threatened or pending litigation. These diversified past contacts
were sufficiently alive to be utilized in the interview situation (p. 35).
This may all be true, but it does not make the sample any more
acceptable for the purpose of a collective profile. Combined with the
author's loose use of quasi-quantitative terms like "few," "some,")
"many," "frequently," "often," and so on, we are left guessing about
the size and quality of the bricks out of which the house is constructed.
The arbitrariness of the sample and the evidently equally arbitrary
length of the interviews are confounded by the method of interviewing.
Since writing the book, Professor Weyrauch has conceded, in a reply to
a review by Professor Max Rheinstein, that "in the present research
the interviews were not entirely non-directive. I think this would have
been almost impossible in conversations which extended over hours, and
which were often carried on in a friendly and relaxed atmosphere."'
This, I daresay, is something of an understatement. From what I can
2 Weyrauch, Some Coniments on Professor Max Rheinstein s Review, 74 YALE L.J.
1335, 1337 (1965).
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reconstruct out of the bits and pieces of conversation reported in the
book, Professor Weyrauch played an active, in fact often aggressive,
part in the interviews, a part that is counter to the benevolent, supportive role of the psychiatrist in the therapeutic situation.
Possibly, the technique of "adversary interviewing," if it can be
called so, can produce some interesting material that more passive
interviewing might not elicit. But if it is useful in reaearch on the
psychology or sociology of the legal profession or on legal behavior, it
deserves careful scrutiny. It may well be an appropriate method of
conversing with lawyers, accustomed as they are to the discovery of
truth through adversary procedures. Whether "truth" comes out of
this system is not the issue here, but it might well tell us something
about the mental stance and the behavioral style-I purposefully avoid
using the term personality-of lawyers.
Finally, Professor Weyrauch goes to great length in defending his
interviewing method by rejecting the method of more structured interviewing as inappropriate in the case of an elite not conditioned, as
Americans are, to polling. German lawyers, he believes, would react
with hostility to questionnaires and object "because it puts lawyers on a
level with other persons and exposes them to comparison with anonymous individuals with whom they may not wish to be identified, even
in the most indirect form" (p. 52). I can only refer to my own experience. In the past year I interviewed, with the aid of local assistants,
97 Austrian politicians. The interviews averaged an hour and a half
and consisted of open-ended, though structured, questions. Not only
did we have the full cooperation of the respondents who did not object
to being interviewed in a standardized manner, but their cooperation
was facilitated by their knowing that all other respondents were interviewed in exactly the same manner. In fact, we were complimented for
our objective approach to the interview situation. The group, by the
way, included lawyers and other professionals with law degrees. I cannot believe that German lawyers would be very different from this
Austrian sample.
I mention all of these methodological problems because they are
relevant to the question of just how a collective profile can be constructed. I would argue that even if one had a genuinely random
sample of lawyers, and even if the respondents were interviewed in a
systematic fashion-in other words, if one would impose rather stringent conditions on research-the construction of a collective profile is a
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most hazardous enterprise, as the more grotesque descriptions of
"national character" a few years back have shown. In short, if this
kind of research is worthwhile, and I think it is, I would plead for
distributive data which permit us to inspect the raw materials before
some kind of summary statement is attempted.
Just as it is of questionable scientific merit to characterize a whole
people as "authoritarian" or "democratic," so it is rather dubious to
characterize a whole profession as "obsessional" or "compulsive." Yet,
this is just what Professor Weyrauch does. Let me quote from his
evaluation in the chapter entitled "The Mental Health of Lawyers."
After admitting the difficulty of sorting out compulsive from normal
individuals and leaving unanswered the question of the positive functions of compulsiveness, Professor Weyrauch continues:
It appears, though, that lawyers as a group show signs of anxiety and
compulsiveness with high frequency.... Contrary to their professional
manner, many of the subjects were inhibited and timid in private contacts.
It is probable that they had made efforts since their early years to cope
with a felt inadequancy. From the various alternatives originally available
to them, at least as far as German conditions were concerned, the one of
asserting their manhood by founding a family early and standing on their
own feet was evidently thought to be least desirable. Instead, they may
have attempted to solve their problems by choosing law as a profession,
the immediate consequence of which was to prolong adolescence. The
many years of study gave, for instance, excuses not to marry and to stay
with the parents or with a widowed mother (p. 265). (Emphasis added
and footnote omitted).
I am sure that many readers will consider this statement as absurd. But
even if we take Professor Weyrauch at his word that the study is
"hypothesis-forming rather than hypothesis-testing" (pp. 4-5), one
may question the validity of an evaluation such as this, given the
methods of inquiry that were employed. I doubt very much that the
kind of interviews conducted in this study can produce the kind of
materials which are needed for the kind of interpretation that is sought.
I am all the more flabbergasted because, in a moment of perhaps
uncalled-for methodological candor, Professor Weyrauch informs us
that:
Stereotyped answers, parochial attitudes, and techniques of evasion soon
accumulated to a surprising extent. After about fifteen intensive interviews little new material was uncovered, although most subjects continued
to be convinced of the uniqueness of their statements. The repetitive
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flavor in many interviews and the resulting danger of boredom might
have been fatal to the research but for the stimulation provided by a small
circle of persons who showed genuine interest (p. 41). (Footnote omitted).
In other words, Professor Weyrauch's technique of interviewing was
evidently not more successful than the technique of structured interviewing. What he complains about here is a common experience in
more standardized interviewing, and we do not have any distributive
data at all to judge for ourselves. But if Professor Weyrauch's subjects
behaved this way, one wonders just what the merits of his interview
technique are, and one has even more reason to wonder about the
elaborate and intricate interpretation put on what, from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, are obviously poor results. If, after 15 interviews, the
method of free association cannot produce more and new materials, it
is hardly worth the time it takes to employ it. The point to be made is,
of course, that Professor Weyrauch's method, as suggested earlier, was
psychoanalytic in a very special sense, though it did not keep him from
coming to rather extravagant conclusions about the psychic life of
lawyers.
It is difficult to say something substantial about the substance of this
book rather than about its methods, for one's appraisal of substance
depends on one's appraisal of method. Another methodological observation must, therefore, be made. In order to protect the anonymity of
his respondents, to "de-identify" them, Professor Weyrauch breaks his
interviews down into isolated quotations. The quotations are organized
according to certain value categories, such as enlightenment, skill,
respect, affection, rectitude, well-being, wealth and power, derived from
the work of Professor Harold D. Lasswell of the Yale Law School.
This is quite skillfully done for the purposes of description and classification, but it is unfortunate for the purposes of interpretation and
evaluation. Though the study claims to be "contextual" (p. 34), the
quotations are presented out of the context from which they come.
This may be legitimate to illustrate particular hypotheses, but it
severely limits the substantive usefulness of the book. From the
perspective of a collective profile, this extreme type of de-identification
does not permit the reader to appraise either the incidence or quality
of a given type of statement. Certainly, the study of personality involves more than the stringing together of out-of-context quotations
from a set of very diverse conversations with a variety of persons quite
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differently connected with the legal process. When, many years ago,
Professor Lasswell suggested certain "political types" on the basis of
depth materials of a psychoanalytic sort, he presented his data in
context, that is, he summarized the material on any one individual in
toto.3 This is necessary because psychoanalysis permits a great variety
of interpretations. In Lasswell's reports, the reader was in a position
to judge for himself whether the analyst's interpretation was adequate
and appropriate or not. This is quite impossible in the presentation of
material by Professor Weyrauch.
Finally, a methodological comment about the comparisons between
German and American lawyers to which Professor Weyrauch aspires.
For anyone who takes comparison seriously as the single, most relevant
approximation to the experimental design of natural science, Professor
Weyrauch's comparisons are unacceptable. Take a statement like this:
An American psychiatrist with teaching experience in medical and
law schools, after seeing the data, was struck by a similarity in the atti-

tudes of lawyers in Germany and United States and their use of similar
psychological defenses. The interviewer's personal observations of
American law students, lawyers, and law professors over a period of
more than ten years seem to bear this out (p. 278). (Footnote omittted.)
I don't think I need to comment on this use of comparison. Professor
Weyrauch has conceded its inadequacy in his reply to Professor Rheinstein: "The comparisons with the American scene are, of course, unsupported by my data, and are not meant to be more than mere
suggestions in my book.""
All this is not to say that this is not a very suggestive book, even if it
does not really say anything valid about "the personality of lawyers,"
as its title claims, or anything reliable about "a comparative study of
subjective factors in law," as its subtitle alleges. For recorded here are
the fragments of conversations with German lawyers about a great
variety of topics, from legal education, legal practice, legal procedure,
legal ethics, and so on, to observations about the status and prestige of
lawyers, the differences between the systems of Anglo-American and
Roman law, the economics of the legal profession, and sundry other
matters. And it provides some insights into certain opinions, attitudes,
orientations, perceptions, taboos, preferences, identifications, expecta3 LASSWELL, Powm
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4 Weyrauch, supra note 2, at 1336.
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tions and behavioral styles of some German lawyers. Unfortunately,
because of its inadequate comparative framework, it is impossible to
say whether these things are expressions of the German culture in
particular or of the culture of the legal profession across national
boundaries in general. In short, the question whether there is a culture
of the legal profession transcending the frontiers of nation or legal system remains unanswered.
As a political scientist, I was particularly interested in Professor
Weyrauch's evaluation of the lawyer's role in politics. As is well
known, lawyers do play a highly visible role in American politics.' But
again, because I think Professor Weyrauch is more intent on making a
case for his psychoanalytic interpretation than on evaluating the role of
the legal profession in politics, he is the prisoner of his approach. In a
critical paragraph he writes, for instance: "Although in every power
process lawyers will be found on both sides of the fence, it is likely
that the more highly qualified will adhere to the side holding and defending an already existing power position" (pp. 280-81). This may
be so, but Professor Weyrauch's estimate here is not based on inference from empirical data, but derived from his almost axiomatic position that lawyers, as a group, are characterized by compulsive personality traits. He writes:
Correspondingly on the American domestic level, lawyers will be prominent in the battle for states' rights, frequently resisting federal interference, stalling projects of wider than local scope, and advocating the status
quo, irrespective of whether the matter is one of racial, religious, or social
discrimination (p. 283).
The issue is not whether this conclusion is true or false in an
empirical sense, but whether the data support the axiom that lawyers
behave as they do because they have certain (obsessional or compulsive) personalities. I am not in a position to contradict Professor
Weyrauch's diagnosis. I would only argue that, until all the facts are
in, or at least more facts than we now have, it is hazardous to make
such statements. Indeed, because they are familiar presuppositions
about the behavior of lawyers, they deserve empirical investigation. It
is my impression that lawyers have played equally prominent roles in
the forefronts of revolutionary movements, from the French to the
5 See EULAU & SPRAGUE, LAWvYERS
VERGENCE

(1964).
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recent Cuban Revolution. What is needed, clearly, are comparative
historical and sociological studies of lawyers in different societies.
In particular, we need studies of the legal profession that are cast in
more sophisticated research designs, including, for purposes of scientific control, lawyers in politics, lawyers out of politics, and politicians

who are not lawyers. Otherwise the data that are collected do not
permit the falsification of hypotheses, regardless of whether these
hypotheses are derived from psychoanalytic or any other set of axiomatic presuppositions.
HEiNz EULAU*
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White. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1965. Pp. xv, 259. $8.95.

A perusal of the cover literature encasing the volume discloses that
"Gillian White" in fact is Gillian Mary White. Our author proves to
be not a venerable Justinian, but a common law Portia, a Barrister-atLaw of Gray's Inn, a Ph.D from the University of London and a Cambridge University Research Fellow.
The book is designed to fill a textual void discovered by the author
when, for a corporate client, she undertook to research the law regarding the use of experts by international tribunals. It is the fourth
volume to be published in the Procedural Aspects of International
Law Series. Its scope is thus defined: "This study is restricted to the
use of independent experts by international judicial tribunals" (p. 3).
Although, on occasion, these "experts" may give oral testimony in
court and possibly be subjected to oral examination by agents of the
parties, their submissions are much more likely to be made in formal
written reports to which the parties may add their written comments.
Those with a common law background should distinguish such "experts" from "expert witnesses" in common law courts whether called
by a party or by the court itself.
International tribunals possess implied rule-making authority and,
unless expressly prevented by the terms of the organic statute of a
permanent body, or a provision of the compromis submitting a cause
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